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Abstract
China has gained experience with voluntary agreements. In this paper the experiences in China
will be analysed and compared to the factors contributing to the success of this model in the
Netherlands. Are voluntary agreements an alternative for the Chinese command and control
system? We distinguish different types of voluntary agreements and compare those in China and
the Netherlands on a number of dimensions. The hypothesis is tested that voluntary agreements
are more effective in achieving pollution control than the traditional command and control
approach. It is found that indeed most voluntary agreements score good in China as well as in
the Netherlands on a number of chosen indicators. Voluntary agreements are effective in achiev-
ing ambitious energy saving targets in a flexible and cost-effective way. Voluntary agreements have
the function to mobilise support for energy saving, which is not easily mobilised through the
traditional command-and-control approaches. There are however some important differences
between the functioning of the system in China and in the Netherlands, where a more bottom-up
approach is common. The Netherlands has a tradition of stakeholders’ involvement and experi-
ence over a longer time of monitoring the effectiveness of the project and adjusting them
if necessary.
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Introduction
Voluntary approaches appeared in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries in the middle of 1960s and the early 1970s. The definition
of VAs is broad and varied. Many arrangements can be encompassed in the scope of VAs,
such as self-regulation, voluntary initiatives, voluntary agreements, long-term agreements
(LTAs), negotiated environmental agreements, covenants, etc. A voluntary agreement is a
voluntarily signed and binding public–private partnership between governmental and indus-
trial parties that establishes a negotiated and mutually agreed upon target for energy-
efficiency and environmental improvement over a long-term period including specified facil-
itation by supporting policies and instruments. It has a long-term outlook (typically 5–10
years) and governmental supporting policies assist companies in reaching targets. These
agreements include an implementation plan for reaching the targets and annual monitoring
and supervision of progress toward the targets. It is a participatory public–private partner-
ship that combines sustainable development with innovation management and provides
constructive dialogue and structured communication between public and private partners
via industrial consultative groups and voluntary agreement platforms. It provides bottom-
up feedback on required policy framing (mix of carrots and sticks) and suggestions for
further actions and improvement options.
Voluntary agreements were introduced in the Netherlands as LTAs in 1992. The first
phase 1 (LTA 1) was implemented during the period of 1992–2000, and phase 2 LTA2 was
implemented during the period of 2001–2008. The Netherlands is now in the process of the
LTA on energy efficiency (LEE) and in phase 3 (LTA3). The LEE covenant (introduced in
2009) is intended for large industrial companies for which participation in the European
Emissions Trading System (ETS) is compulsory. LTA3 (introduced in 2008) is intended
for non-ETS enterprises and LTA3 focuses on process efficiency, supply chain
efficiency and renewable energy. The LEE relates primarily to process efficiency and
supply chain efficiency.
China started VA activities in 2005, learning from European experiences, particularly
from the Netherlands LTA experiences, and the VA has been implemented in three phases.
Phase 1 (2005) is the execution of a comparative EU-China feasibility study reviewing pol-
icies and management instruments in energy saving and emission reduction including
questionnaire surveys and development of China-specific covenant blueprint. Phase 2
(2008–2010) is the demonstration of VA business case for public and private partners by
testing and improving blueprint for 14 large companies in Nanjing, Xian and Kelamayi.
Main supporting activities included benchmarking, negotiating targets, development of
improvement plans, implementing projects, financial and organizational capacity building
by advisory and supervision visits and training, performance evaluation, providing incen-
tives and the publication of a manual for guiding implementation throughout China.
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Phase 3 (2011–2015) is focusing on the scaling up of covenants throughout China, thereby
contributing significantly to the global mitigation of climate change including widening
agreements from large companies to small and medium enterprises (SME) sectors. Major
activities include design of a SME blueprint, training of SME associations, strengthening the
financial and institutional enabling environment, improving policy framing related to
China’s Five-Year Plan cycle outreach throughout China.
The main arguments from the practices of VA worldwide include the legal base of VAs
(legally binding or not), VA’s threat to competition, VA’s environmental and economic
effectiveness and the relation of VA and regulatory approaches. This paper is based on
outputs of an EU funded three phases project on adoption of VA in China. It addresses the
following issues with the aim of recommending China designing and implementing more
effective VA policies.
1. A systematic comparison of Netherlands LTA and China VA.
2. Are VAs in China legally binding or legally not binding?
3. Are VAs in China a threat to fair competition?
4. Are VAs in China environmentally and economically effective, compared to business-
as-usual?
5. What are the recommendations for China for upscaling VAs and improving effectiveness
of VAs implementations?
Theoretical review
The theoretical advantages of VAs are flexibility and cost effectiveness, and allow for poten-
tial savings in administrative costs (B€orkey,1 p.6; Higley,2 p.10). The opportunities for VAs
to public authorities and branch associations or firms can be discussed as following. Firstly,
the public authority can benefit from avoiding the challenges posed by the
traditional instruments. As Higley and Le´veˆque2 state ‘the legal procedure of command-
and-control instrument can be time consuming and expensive to implement in the event of
non-compliance. The market based instrument can pose institutional challenges – typically
requiring the involvement of fiscal and tax collection authorities in policy design and
execution’. Negotiated agreements can benefit the governments, for instance, decreasing
administration cost on avoiding putting new legislation or new tax, especially in the case
of the target of agreements beyond the requirement of regulation.
Secondly as mentioned by Alberini and Segerson,3 firms are profit-oriented, they will only
undertake to invest in further pollution abatement if they expect a net gain for so doing.
Five opportunities the firms might gain if participating in negotiated agreements.2 Firstly,
the participating firms gain the authority to determine the cost-effective measures to abate
their pollutions. VAs shift the responsibility to firms to formulate their own environmental
policy. As a result, they allow industry much more flexibility in formulating the means by
which it will reduce pollution. VAs engage industry, and invest them with active role
in determining the most effective and cost-efficient way to achieve environmental goals.
As in the past, the responsibility for setting targets and outline methods has in the hand
of environmental regulators.
The firms are believed knowing better than government on how to reduce their pollution.
Secondly, VAs promote an open flow of information within industry association, particu-
larly where agreements are made with an entire association. Such industry wide agreements
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create a forum for the individual firms to communicate in the most efficient manner.
Thirdly, a firm may benefit the opportunity of better use of, and access to inputs. It is
due to the fact that the improvement of environmental performance can lead to an addi-
tional outcome in lower consumption costs and pollution abatement. Fourthly, VAs may
produce input savings by enhancing the reputations of participating firms. The firms with
good reputation on environment may contribute its relationship with stakeholders (clients,
employees and government). The firms may benefit from, for instance, by attracting, recruit-
ing and retaining employees and reducing the administrative cost of regulatory compliance.
Finally, VAs may help firms by increasing sales because of the rising willingness of clients to
buy green products. The green firm will be rewarded by the increase in market share of the
environmental friendly products.
Some researchers argue that VAs have negative effects as well. One issue is that VAs may
lead to regulatory capture by industry. Pollution firms have a clear incentive to obstruct the
introduction of a more stringent environmental policy since the abatement of emissions is
costly. The policy is said to have been ‘captured’ by industry when they do not pay additional
expenses for the environment. The Wuppertal institute of Climate, Energy and Environment
also argues that ‘a voluntary approach will be considered as being captured by industry when
the environmental target set is not more than the abatement associated with a business-
as-usual (BaU) pattern’.4 In other words ‘the closer the target to BaU pattern, the higher
degree of capture of a voluntary approach by industry interests’.1 The consequences of
regulatory capture may be poor environmental performance of the agreement.
The other issue is the occurrence of free riders. This issue occurs in negotiated agreements
concluded between public authorities and a sector association with industry-wide targets.
The regulation or tax can be avoided if industry-wide targets are complete. Then non-
participating firms can benefit from the participation of other polluters. Each polluter has
an incentive not to participate if it believes (or hopes) that the participation of other
polluters will be sufficient to meet the target to prevent the costly new policy.
The third issue is VAs may influence competition. EU legislation prohibits the formation
of any agreement that negatively affects free trade and competition in Europe. VAs have
indirect effects on market structures, and can lead to strategic anticompetitive behaviour.
There appears to be a trade-off between the goal of maintaining a competitive market and
taking advantage of the flexibility and efficiency created by VAs.2
In the middle of 1990s, the European Commission (EC) produced a communication on
the use of negotiated agreements as an instrument for the implementation of environmental
policy in the Community.EEA5, p.17). The EC concluded that ‘negotiated agreements with
industry have an important role to play within the mix of policy instrument. They can offer
cost-effective solutions when implementing environmental objectives and can bring effective
measures in advance of and in supplement to legislation. In order to be effective, it is
essential, however to ensure their transparency and reliability’.
Many researchers stress that the proper design could contribute significantly for enhanc-
ing the transparency and reliability of VAs. Many suggestions were given for identifying
possible safeguards against the main shortcomings of VAs. Generally speaking, they can be
listed as below.
1. Create an open and transparent target setting process;
2. Ambitious target setting (more than business-as-usual);
3. Clearly quantitative target and timetable;
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4. Communication between the parties;
5. Inclusion of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms;
6. An efficient burden sharing of targets among firms;
7. Third party participation;
8. Sanctions for non-compliance;
9. Legally binding with law; and
10. The threat of regulation.
The elements mentioned above are intended to serves as tools for the planning, designing,
negotiation and performance of negotiated agreements, and also serve as guidance for this
research to measuring the success and fail factors of the Dutch covenants towards their
environmental effectiveness.
A systematic comparison of VA China and VA the Netherlands
The analytical framework for this research distinguishes the following nine elements of the
system of achieving a voluntary agreement. The research approach chosen for this study is a
systematic review of implementations of voluntary agreement (VA) in China and LTA in the
Netherlands (Table 1).
Table 1 shows that there are important differences between VAs in China and LTAs in
the Netherlands. The similarities are the objectives, incentives and penalties, monitoring and
evaluation, sector concerned and the mechanism of reaching agreement. However, the major
differences seem to be
1. The initiative in NL often comes from the sector and the negotiations are carried out by
independent sector organizations. In China local government is more motivated at the
earlier stage.
2. The motivations of industries adopting VA in China are the increasing environmental
pressures and getting stricter of environmental regulations and standards. Motivations in
the Netherlands are the reduction of production costs and increasing of resource efficien-
cy. Thus the main difference between China and the Netherlands is that China’s indus-
tries are adopting VA for reducing environmental impacts and complying more strictly
environmental regulations and the Netherlands’s industries are adopting VA more for
reducing production costs and improving resource resources.
3. There seems to be more real stakeholder involvement in the NL, where also SME can be
involved in the negotiations.
4. The difference in the governance structure for the LTAs in NL and VAs in China means
that the traditional role of the government as independent regulator is some-
what undermined.
5. Both China and the Netherlands successfully involved small enterprises as well at a
later stage.
The numbers of VA/LTA failures are three (out of the 52 big companies active). In
particular 28 out of the 813 laundry SMEs, and 13 out of the 147 textile SMEs. The
main reasons for this failure are the economic crisis starting in 2008. Other reasons men-
tioned are the changing of production, changing of company management and changing of
key staff members. Numbers of LTA failures are very few in the Netherlands and the main
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reason is changing of production. There are no cases in the Netherlands that changing
of company management and changing of key staff could result in failure of VA.
A comparison of results achieved by VA China and LTA Netherlands
The Netherlands covenants are planned to run through to 2020. It is therefore worthwhile
assessing the results over a longer period. Figures 1 and 2 show the results of the covenant
from the start to 2014. These figures show that both covenants are achieving stable savings.
As compared to 2009, the starting year of the covenant, LEE achieved an energy efficiency
Table 1. A comparison of VAs in China and LTAs in the Netherlands.
Dimension China The Netherlands
Initiative, from the
government or
private sector
Very much from the government An interaction
Motivation of indus-
tries adopting VA
Environmental pressures, increasing strict
of environmental regulations
and standards
Reducing production costs and
increasing resource efficiency
Action level Local National
Legal status Legally unbinding Legally binding
Scale of VA
implementation
52 big companies that will participate in
national ETS, 813 laundry SMEs and 147
textile SMEs at the end of 2016.
Numbers are still increasing and VA may
be disseminated into more cities.Total
energy consumption of VA companies in
China is 950 PJ per year, which is less
than 1% of total industrial energy con-
sumption of China.
LEE: 100 big companies partici-
pating in EU ETS.
LTA3: about 1000 companies.
Both LEE and LTA3 companies
consume 830 PJ of primary
energy in a year, which makes
up about 80% of the total
industrial energy use.
Sectors concerned Energy-intensive, both big companies
and SMEs
Energy-intensive, both big com-
panies and SMEs
Efficiency concerned The existing VA is only concerning the
process efficiency, and chain efficiency is
not yet included. Future VA may also
concern the chain efficiency.
Process efficiency, chain efficien-
cy and renewable energy
are concerned.
Period length Excepting phase 1 (feasibility study, 2005)
and phase 2 (demonstration, 2008–
2010), phase 3 is well fitting with China
national five-year plan (2011–2015). It is
estimated that future VA in China will
also fit into China’s five-year
plan system.
Long-term agreement, phase 1:
1992–2000, phase 2: 2001–
2008 and phase 3: 2009–2020.
Monitoring
& evaluation
Monitoring is done by companies. For big
companies, verification by third party.
For SMEs, verifications are done by
public institutes authorized by local
authorities.
Self-reporting and verified by
third party.
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improvement in, 2014 of 7.8%, or 1.6% per year (see Figure 1). The lion’s share of this
saving (6.5%) is due to process efficiency.
Between, 2005 and 2020, the participants in LTA3 have expressed the ambition of achiev-
ing an overall efficiency improvement of 30%. To 2014, an improvement of 21.2% has been
achieved (on average 2.4% per year). Here, too, the majority (18.3%) relates to process
efficiency (on average 2.0% per year) as compared to a 20% target for internal energy
efficiency (see Figure 2). If chain efficiency in the production chain and chain efficiency
achieved abroad as well as renewable energy are included, the total result amounts to
39.9%, of which roughly half consists of the purchase of renewable energy. In effect, this
means that the 30% target for, 2020 has already been achieved. At an earlier stage, financial
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Process eﬃciency Producon eﬃciency
Figure 1. Saving LEE 2009–2014 (process efficiencyþ production chain domestic). (Data source:
Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2015.6)
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Figure 2. Saving LTA3 2005–2014 (process efficiencyþ chain efficiencyþ renewable energy). (Data source:
Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2015.6)
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incentives were available in the Netherlands and policy incentives are available for the whole
period. In China both policy and financial incentives are available for the whole period.
Financial incentives are mainly for companies conducting feasibility study, developing
action plans and capacity building and networking. According to agreement, penalties
include refunding of financial incentives, increasing of emission fee and bad images.
In China, 52 big energy intensive companies (petrochemical, cement, iron-steel, heat and
electricity, paper-making and manufactures) from Nanjing, Changchun, Xian and
Kelemayi, 813 SMEs in laundry sector of Nanjing and 147 SMEs in the textile sector of
Jingzhou have participated in the VA implementation. China launched its national ETS at
the end of, 2017 and some of these 52 big companies have participated in the ETS. For
assessing the results achieved, China is applying energy efficiency index (EEI). EEI is defined
as the ratio between the energy consumption of target year and specific energy consumption
of reference year multiplied by the productivity (physical production amount) of target year.
The main results achieved are presented in Figures 3 to 5.
Figure 3 shows that the energy efficiency (process efficiency) improvement of the partic-
ipated 52 big companies is 23% in the period of 2011–2015. In the same period, the energy
efficiency improvement of BAU (business-as-usual) is 9%, and thus the value-added of the
50.0
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90.0
100.0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
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I
BAU Achieved by VA
Figure 3. Result achieved by the 52 big companies (process efficiency). (Data source: Zhang et al.7)
BAU: business-as-usual; EEI: energy efficiency index; VA: voluntary agreement.
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Figure 4. Result achieved by the 813 laundry SMEs in Nanjing (process efficiency). (Data source: Zhang et al.7)
BAU: business-as-usual; EEI: energy efficiency index; VA: voluntary agreement.
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voluntary agreement is 14%. Figure 4 shows that the value added through energy efficiency
resulted in an improvement of the 813 laundry SMEs of 18% for the period of 2011–2015.
Figure 5 shows that VA value added energy efficiency improvement of the 147 textile SMEs
is 11% for the period of 2011–2015. Table 2 shows the comparison of results achieved in
China and Netherlands.
Table 2 shows that China’s VA is more effective than the Netherlands LTA for both big
companies and SMEs in both energy efficiency improvement and energy savings. The fun-
damental reason is the huge difference of the baseline level of industrial energy performance
of the Netherlands and China. China’s industrial energy consumption per 10,000 Chinese
Yuan gross domestic product (GDP) is, which is about two times the industrial energy
consumption per GDP of the Netherlands (45,000 US$). Such huge industrial energy effi-
ciency differences mean that China has a much bigger energy saving potentials than in the
Netherlands. This explains why China’s VAs achieve much more energy efficiency improve-
ments and energy savings than the Netherlands’ LTAs and LEE.
50.0
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Figure 5. Result achieved by the 147 Textile SMEs in Jingzhou (process efficiency). (Data source: Zhang et al.7)
BAU: business-as-usual; EEI: energy efficiency index; VA: voluntary agreement.
Table 2. Comparison of VA results in China and the Netherlands.a
For China and the Netherlands
Energy efficiency
improvement
Energy savings
in PJ
Netherlands LEE (100 big companies participating in
EU ETS (2009–2014)
7.8% 7.3
China 52 big companies to be participated in China
ETS (2011–2015)
14% 160.2
Netherlands LTA3 (about 1000 companies) (2005–2014) 21.2% 7.1
China VA (laundry and textile, 960 companies) (2011–2015) 14.5% 21.7
PJ: petajoule.
a1 PJ¼ 34,176 ton coal equivalent. (Data source: primary data.)
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Are China’s VAs environmentally effective and economically efficient?
For assessing the environmental effectiveness, we use the data of 2011–2015 and apply the
following analytical framework in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that VA China is quite effective for both big companies and SMEs in
energy saving and resulted in CO2 reduction, which is estimated by energy reduction.
During the five years period, 1012 VA companies have achieved 181.9 PJ or 6.2 million
ton coal e.q. energy saving, as compared to business-as-usual. According to the current
energy price, value of the 6.2 million ton coal e.q. is about 13 billion Chinese Yuan or
1.7 billion euro. However reduction of pollutant SO2 is not significant, as compared to
energy saving. This may be explained in Figure 6, which shows the numbers of VA solutions
planned and implemented.
Figure 6 shows that 97% of housekeeping solutions and 96% of energy saving solutions
have been implemented, given to the fact that housekeeping solutions are no-investment or
very low investment and mainly on capacity building and awareness raising, and energy
saving solutions makes significant direct economic profits with short pay-back time (PBT).
However only 61% of pollution control solutions have been implemented, since pollution
control solutions hardly make direct economic profits and thus participating companies are
not well motivated to take the actions. Thus we conclude that VA is very effective in
achieving energy and climate target and it may not be effective in achieving environmental
target of pollution control.
For assessing the economically efficient, we calculate the PBT of the measures that are
taken by the participating companies, which is presented in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that payback time of good housekeeping solution for both energy
saving and pollution control is less than one year. Payback time of improved process
technology and equipment for energy saving for both big companies and SMEs is
less than three years and for pollution control is more than five years. Payback time of
replacement or new investment (R&D may be needed in this case) for energy saving is more
than five years, and for pollution control is more than seven years. We therefore conclude
that VA is high economically efficient for energy saving for both big companies and SMEs
and may not be high economically efficient for pollution control. This can be explained that
internationally VA or Netherlands LTA is mainly adopted for achieving energy saving
target and climate targets.
Table 3. Environmentally effectiveness of VAs’ implementation, compared to BAU in China
(2011–2015).a
Energy
saved in PJ
CO2 reduction in
million ton
SO2 reduction
in ton
52 big companies 160.2 14.8 21,898.6
813 laundry SMEs 2.7 0.2 34.7
147 textile SMEs 19.0 1.8 193.5
Total 181.9 16.8 22,126.8
PJ: petajoule.
a1 PJ¼ 34,176 ton coal e.q. CO2 emission reduction is estimated by 1 ton coal e.q.¼ 2.7 tons of CO2. SO2
reduction is measured by local environmental departments. (Data source: primary data.)
10 Energy & Environment 0(0)
Is the VA China a threat to competition?
According to economic theory, voluntary approaches have indirect effects on market struc-
ture and competition whether they are principally aimed at improving the environmental
reputation of the products sold by undertakers or at pre-empting policy interventions based
on regulatory or economic instruments. Moreover, economic analysis provides support to
the intuition that in a few cases voluntary approaches could be adopted with the strategic
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housekeeping enery saving polluon control
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implemented
Figure 6. Numbers of solutions planned and implemented by VA. (Data source: primary data.)
Table 4. Assessment of economically efficient by PBT in China (2011–2015).a
Measures
Average PBT
in years
52 big companies Good housekeeping measures (e.g. improved management and
operating procedures)
1
Improved process technology and equipment for energy saving 3.2
Improved process technology and equipment for pollution control 5
Replacement/new investments for energy saving 5
Replacement/new investments for pollution control 7
813 laundry SMEs Good housekeeping measures (e.g. improved management and
operating procedures)
1
Improved process technology and equipment for energy saving 2.0
Improved process technology and equipment for pollution control 5
Replacement/new investments for energy saving 3
Replacement/new investments for pollution control 7
147 textile SMEs Good housekeeping measures (e.g. improved management and
operating procedures)
1
Improved process technology and equipment for energy saving 2.6
Improved process technology and equipment for pollution control 5
Replacement/new investments for energy saving 4
Replacement/new investments for pollution control 7
aData source: primary data.
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objective to affect market structure and competition conditions (Moffet, 1998).8–9 However,
in general, a concentrated market structure has a positive effect on the environmental effec-
tiveness of the actions undertaken within a voluntary initiative. This clearly raises a trade-off
between the goal of maintaining competition in the market and the objective of exploiting
the well-recognised flexibility that generally characterises voluntary approaches.
Chinese VA is legally unbinding, and there is no evidence that VA China have negative
impact on competition in the market. However, China launched emission trading system
(ETS) of CO2 in 2017. Allocation of emission allowances can be an important mechanism
for addressing competitiveness concerns over carbon pricing for trade-exposed industries
and also to gain buy-in during the early stages of the implementation of the ETS. China is
now allocating allowances mainly based on historic emissions (‘grandfathering’) and bench-
marks play very limited role in allowance allocation. The emerging issue is how to deal with
the VA participating companies who have already made more energy efficiency improve-
ment before and those companies will receive relatively less allowances based on their his-
toric emissions. Thus we concluded that the existing VA practices in China do have negative
impacts on the competitiveness of the existing VA participating companies. In the future,
VA may be an effective instrument for the ETS participating companies reducing their CO2
emissions and thus VA may have positive impacts on competitiveness in China.
Conclusions and policy implication
China and the Netherlands are different countries in terms of scale, political and economic
system. In the Netherlands there is a tradition of stakeholders’ involvement and in the case
of VAs the government is no longer considered the bad cop. However, the objectives and
mechanisms used to come to a VA are largely the same and for that reason a comparison
makes sense. The VAs are a more bottom-up and participatory approach, which means
there is more ownership among the partners of the project to be achieved in the coming
period, which in the end makes it more effective than the traditional command and control
approach. Practices of VAs in China and in the Netherlands show that VA is effective in
achieving ambitious energy saving targets in a flexible and cost-effective way. VA has
potential function to mobilise the potentials of energy saving that are not easily mobilised
by traditional command-and-control approaches.
The ambition has always been to formulate policy implications on the basis of this
research. In particular we like to find out about voluntary restrictions in other sectors.
Thinking in terms of the policy cycle theory, our research provides following recommenda-
tions to the policy makers of China how to improve the system of VAs.
1. It is very important that VA as a supplementary policy instrument should be integrated
into a policy mix for achieving energy and climate change targets and VA alone can never
play a role in realising targets. It is expecting that VA could play an important role in the
moving of China’s existing government to the coming governance.
2. It suggests that the existing VA practices at Chinese local level should be planned and
implemented at national level and, learning by doing, VA could become an effective legal
binding instrument for China dealing with the high pressures of energy efficiency and
emission reduction.
3. It is crucial to recognise the efforts and progress that the VA participating companies
have made before the allowance allocation in the China national ETS and to market sure
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that the existing allowance allocation by grandfathering can never have negative impacts
on the VA participating companies.
4. Adopting the VA in the energy-intensive sectors and sectors that have great potential for
energy savings, given to the fact that cost-effective energy savings can make profits that
are crucial for industries. VA may not be effective in terms of pollution control of reduc-
tion of pollutants, since reduction of pollutants may not make clear direct economic
profits, as compared to energy saving.
5. For enlarging VA’s impacts, it is suggested that not only process efficiency, but also chain
efficiency and renewable energy should be taken into account in VA design and imple-
mentations for China.
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